This paper considers the role of corruption in impelling capital flight. Identifying corruption as one dimension of poor governance, the empirical analysis explores direct linkages between corruption and capital flight in a broad sample of countries. The novelty of this investigation is that it is based on a portfolio choice model of asset allocation that explicitly recognizes corruption as contributing to the variance of domestic investment risk. The main testable proposition emerging from our theoretical specification is stated thus: does corruption impel capital flight by raising the risk of domestic investment, ceteris paribus? An econometric analysis suggests that, holding other determinants of capital flight constant, corruption does have a positive and significant impact on capital flight. Based on these results, the paper concludes that advocating good governance by combating corruption makes a great deal of sense for countries aiming to staunch capital flight.
Introduction
The literature on capital flight has recently focused attention on the role of non-economic variables such as political risk and governance factors in impelling the flight of capital from developing countries (Gibson & Tsakalotos, 1993; Schineller, 1997) . It is broadly understood that political instability and poor governance contribute to a domestic environment that deters investment and induces capital flight. While, Alesina & Tabellini (1989) , Tornell & Velasco (1992) , and Bhattacharya (1999) have proposed theoretical frameworks that examine the association between political instability and the flight of capital, empirical research on the role of political and governance variables on capital flight is rather limited. In large sample studies conducted by , Lensink et al. (2000) and Le & Zak (2006) political risk factors are identified to be quantitatively significant determinants of capital flight, ceteris paribus. This paper seeks to contribute to this strand of literature by empirically testing the direct association between misgovernance and capital flight. Focusing on the existence of corruption as one of the dimensions of misgovernance, 1 the paper asks the following research question -holding constant other determinants of capital flight, is there a significant association between corruption and capital flight?
For purposes of clarity and measurement, this paper will define corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. This interpretation of the term is popular in recent studies that have begun to value the developmental costs of official corruption. According to the World Bank (2005) , in many developing economies, corruption works as a regressive tax -the poor pay a disproportionate share of their income in the form of bribes to secure access to public services. The existence of corruption has also caused many aid-funded projects to fail and the existence of corruption can weaken younger democracies (Kaufman, 2003) . Research by Wei (2002) suggests that bribes and official extortion act as an extra tax and therefore deter potential foreign direct investment into developing countries. Similarly, Wei & Wu (2001) have examined corruption as a source of macroeconomic vulnerability and lower economic growth. However, this nascent literature on corruption has paid scant attention to the association between corruption and capital flight.
This paper attempts to address this research gap by investigating the impact of corruption on capital flight, holding constant other macroeconomic causes of flight. This paper is not an analysis of the determinants of capital flight per se; rather it aims to focus attention on the corruption-capital flight linkage for a sample of developed and developing countries. In this regard, a novelty of this paper is that it infers corruption as an investment risk and explicitly includes corruption in a domestic investment risk function. Thus, our testable proposition can be restated as follows: does corruption impel capital flight by raising the risk of domestic investment, ceteris paribus? We test this proposition for a panel of 69 countries over a seven-year period from 1995-2001.
The paper is divided into the following sections. The next section motivates the study by highlighting specific case studies of corruption and capital flight. The third section develops a statistical model specification based on a portfolio choice model of asset allocation to test the direct linkages between corruption and capital flight. The fourth section discusses the variables employed in the regression analysis. The fifth section summarizes the empirical results and the sixth section concludes.
Case Studies of Corruption and Capital Flight
From anecdotal accounts about the money laundering scams engineered by the Nigerian military dictator Sani Abacha and his cronies in the 1990s to the scandals surrounding the foreign holdings of the Philippines' Marcos family in the 1980s, the corruption-capital flight connection has certainly been well scrutinized in the media. Indeed, the cases provided below illustrate how corruption by government officials, arising from embezzlement of public funds and bribes and kickbacks on government contracts, falsification of prices on import and export transactions, and fake real estate transactions have been popular mechanisms of capital flight.
China
Zhou (2000) of the China Daily Hong Kong Edition quotes the State Administration of Foreign Exchange in reporting that capital flight from China amounted to US$52 billion between 1997 and 1999. A significant part of that money involved corruption by high-ranking officials. According to the article, most embezzlement cases involved senior officials that simultaneously held key positions in the state-owned enterprises and within the Party. The absolute authority enjoyed by these officials enabled them to ensure their security by sending their families abroad and setting up overseas subsidiaries with impunity. These family-owned subsidiaries in turn falsified prices on import and export transactions in order to generate a comfortable margin that was then paid into foreign bank accounts.
Mexico
According to a report by Seid (1996) of the Christian Science Monitor, around US$76 billion fled Mexico between 1981 and 1996. The author also cites an investigation conducted by CBS's 60 Minutes in June 1996 which claimed that overseas hidden assets of Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of former Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, could be worth more than US$300 million. During the Salinas Administration, major economic sectors were privatized and widespread political corruption was associated with the sale of assets in telecommunication firms, banks, and the state television network. It is estimated that revenues of some US$26 billion were realized through privatization, but all the money disappeared.
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Without accountability due to poor governance, the money trails were not identified (Seid, 1996) .
Further, Seid (1996) posits that all recent Mexican presidents have left office far more affluent than their salaries would rationalize. For instance, when former president Luis Echeverria Alvarez left office in 1976, he was listed as one of the world's five richest men by the French magazine Paris-Match. In the same report, Washington columnist Jack Anderson notes that former President Jose Lopez Portillo also amassed billions during his term in office from 1976-1982.
Russia
Following the 1998 debt crisis, Russia has experienced the largest amount of capital flight among all transition economies (Loungani & Mauro, 2000) . Researchers agree that the transition process in Russia fostered growing levels of corruption which in turn created incentives for flight and discouraged asset accumulation within Russia (Abalkin, 1999; Mulino, 2002) . Russian corruption is a result of complex tax, licensing, and custom systems and low government salaries. Further, local managers tend to foster corrupt relationships with government officials 'as a hedge against the uncertainty of government policies' (Mulino, 2002, p. 163) . Bribes are fairly commonplace in the licensing and permit granting offices as local enterprises tend to circumvent tedious official regulations by paying 'unofficial' fees. 2 Moreover, as documented by Loungani & Mauro (2000) the capital and exchange controls applied in response to the 1998 crisis in Russia may have increased the scope for official corruption as the enforcement of such controls is ultimately dependent on bureaucratic discretion.
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the existence of pervasive corruption negatively affects Russia's investment climate and encourages capital flight. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (1999), Russian capital flight was close to 3% of GDP in 1995 3% of GDP in -1996 3% of GDP in , rose to 9% by 1998 3% of GDP in , and 18% by 2004 . Recent estimates by Peter Westin, an economist at Moscow's Aton investment bank place capital flight for 2004 at around US$12 billion (Nicholson, 2005) .
The foregoing cases certainly demonstrate the existence of a corruptioncapital flight connection. In fact, a recent report by Baker (1999) to the US Senate Commission on Governmental Affairs claims that at least US$100 billion annually courses into the United States and Europe through corruption and trade misinvoicing alone. In view of the staggering sums involved it is surprising that the corruption-capital flight link has received scant academic attention. To address this shortcoming, the remainder of this article is devoted to developing and testing a framework that explores the direct association between corruption and capital flight. Figure 1 also suggests that developed countries are less corrupt and experience less capital flight compare to developing countries. The previous section provided reasonable a priori evidence of a positive association between corruption and capital flight. This section explores the corruption-capital flight link in greater detail by modeling the relationship in a portfolio choice framework of asset allocation based on Le & Zak (2006) .
A Testable Model of Corruption and Capital Flight
Consider an economy with a large number of infinitely-lived identical agents. Agents consume from the return on wealth allocated to one period investment in the domestic country or to a single foreign country. For simplicity there is one investment in each country that could be considered a portfolio of investments. We exclude labor from the analysis. There is a single homogeneous good produced in both countries, and population is constant, immobile, and normalized to unity.
Let a t denote investment in the domestic market at time t that earns rate of return R t . Investments in the domestic market are assumed to be risky because of poor governance, R N(m,s 2 ). Agents also invest a t f in a foreign country, earning a risk-free time-invariant rate of return R f , which can be considered as the US government bonds. 
where U(c) is strictly increasing, continuous, and concave. Solving the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum to the utility maximization problem (1) yields
where VAR(R tþ1 ) is the variance of the return on domestic investment, and the risk aversion is u ;
Let us also assume that there is an analogous problem being solved by individuals in the other countries. Denote the capital outflows and capital inflows from equation (3) as a f W t¼1 and a f Ã t¼1 , respectively. We then define the net capital
Equation (4) shows that in equilibrium the capital stock from the domestic country consists of domestic investment and net foreign investment, where both depend on the political and economic characteristics of the domestic and foreign markets.
In order to obtain the equilibrium capital flight equation, we rearrange equation (4) and substitute out domestic investment a Ã t¼1 using equation (3)
Equation (5) predicts that capital flight is higher when the domestic expected return is low, domestic investment risk is high, and when the risk aversion is high. Equation (5) at time t is estimable by dividing both sides by K t to obtain capital flight as the ratio of physical capital stock,
Since our main interest is in the determinants of domestic investment risk, the next step is to decompose the variance of the return on domestic investment. We focus on four sources of the variation in returns: inflation risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, and corruption. While the former three types of risk have been traditionally associated with measurable economic risk (Lucas, 1972; De Gregorio, 1993; Adji et al., 1997) , the explicit introduction of corruption as a contributor to domestic investment risk is a novelty of this paper. The decision to include corruption into the domestic investment risk function is motivated by studies that have focused on corruption and the investment decision. For instance, Wedeman (1997) contends that the level of corruption can vitiate the domestic investment climate by contributing to uncertainty and insecurity. Other studies have implied that corruption can lower the quality of investment in an economy especially in infrastructure (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) . Corrupt regimes have also been associated with political/policy risk that can increase the variance of domestic returns (Mehlkop et al., 2004) .
In light of the above and assuming that each type of risk is independently distributed, the risk of domestic investment at time t may be described as:
Inserting equation (7) into equation (6), 3 the following model of corruptioncapital flight is specified:
Equation (8) provides us with the main testable proposition of this paper that corruption can impel capital flight by raising the risk of domestic investment, given the return differential, the level of real GDP, and standard economic risk factors.
The next section discusses the variables employed in the above specification.
Data

Dependent Variable -Capital Flight
The dependent variable is capital flight expressed as a percentage of GDP. Three commonly used measures of capital flight have been developed by the World Bank (1985) , Morgan Guaranty Trust (1986), and Cline (1987) . 4 We use the World Bank method, which is considered to be the broadest estimate of capital flight in order to minimize potential biases in narrower measures. The World Bank method compares the sources of finance 3 Using a linear production function to transform physical capital stock (K t ) into output, Y t ¼ lK t , for l . 0, K t in equation (6) can be written in terms of real GDP.
(the change in external debt and net foreign direct investment), with the uses of finance (current account deficit and the change in official reserves). Capital flight occurs when sources of finance exceed uses of finance. This 'residual' includes assets of both the banking and non-banking sectors. The balanceof-payments data used to estimate capital flight are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2004).
Independent Variable
Corruption, our main variable of interest is difficult to measure. Empirical evidence on, say, bribery court cases or prosecutions is of little use in crosscountry studies such as ours because such data may simply reflect the quality of the judiciary as opposed to actual corruption. In order to conduct analyses of corruption across countries it is more meaningful to measure the impressions of respondents who are directly impacted by corruption. For this reason, most researchers prefer to use corruption measures that are based on subjective perceptions by survey respondents. Accordingly, this paper employs a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International as the basic measure of corruption. The CPI ranks countries by the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians as gauged by business people, academics and risk analysts, both resident and non-resident in countries around the world. It is a 'pool of pools' drawn on 17 surveys from 13 independent institutions. Given the definition of corruption adopted by this paper, the choice of the CPI as a corruption measure is appropriate. As CPI scores range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt), we have inverted these scores to make them consistent with the magnitude of capital flight in order to facilitate interpretation.
As explained above, corruption is but one dimension of poor governance. In order to test a broader measure of governance, we also employ the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating as an alternate independent variable. The ICRG is an overall index, ranging from 0 (highest risk) to 100 (lowest risk) based on 22 variables in three subcategories of country risk: political, financial, and economic. 5 Data on this variable were obtained from the World Development Indicators (2004) and like the CPI, the ICRG score was also inverted before employing it in the empirical analysis.
Other Control Variables
As detailed in the previous section, economic risk is measured by the variation in inflation rates (s 2 INF), real interest rates (s 2 INT), and exchange rates (s 2 EXR). A high variance of inflation rates and real interest rates indicates 5 The ICRG incorporates a 'Type II' forecast in which its experts provide a current assessment, a one-year assessment, and a five-year assessment. The projections of future conditions are framed in 'best' case and 'worst' case scenarios. monetary and macroeconomic uncertainty (Freeman, 1977; De Gregorio, 1993) . Hence, these variables are hypothesized to have a positive sign. Further, according to Adji et al. (1997) exchange rate depreciation increases the return on investment, while exchange rate appreciation reduces the return on investment. Thus, the variance of the exchange rates as indicator of market distortions is expected to be positively related to capital flight.
The return differential (R 2 R f ), estimated as the domestic real interest rate minus the average US government bond rate, is expected to have a negative sign because a higher domestic return rate compared to the foreign return rate would result in capital reversal. The level of real GDP (GDP) is also expected to have a negative sign because, as shown in Figure 1 , developed countries with higher real GDP levels are associated with less corruption and experience lesser capital flight compared to developing countries with lower level of real GDP.
Data for inflation (consumer prices, annual percentage), real interest rates (percentage), official exchange rates (LCU per US$, period average), and real GDP are obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2004) . Descriptive statistics on all variables are presented in Tables 1 and 2 details the correlations among all variables. As suggested by theory, there is a high correlation observed between the variance of inflation rates and the variance of the real exchange rates. Table 2 also evidences a high degree of correlation, being 0.70, between capital flight and corruption. The following section subjects the model specified above to econometrically explore the association between corruption and capital flight.
Empirical Results
This section presents the econometric results obtained by empirically testing equation (8) for a panel of 69 developed and developing countries. Four specifications of equation (8) were tested using a fixed-effects model to control for the country-specific characteristics. The Hausman test confirms the appropriateness of a fixed-effects model for all regression specifications and the results are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. In specifications (A) to (C), the parameters of economic risk, namely variance of inflation rates (s 2 INF), variance of real interest rates (s 2 INT), and the variance of real exchange rates (s 2 EXR) enter the estimation independently in order to evaluate their direct impact on capital flight. Specification (D) is the full model that includes all economic risk variables to determine their combined significance. The main explanatory variable, CORRUPTION is included in every specification. As part of a robustness check, we also include a broader measure of governance -ICRG -in our statistical analysis.
A panel data analysis of corruption and capital flight does indicate a positive and significant effect of corruption on capital flight. In particular, the coefficient of corruption in specification (A) suggests that an increase in corruption by one standard deviation induces an increase of almost 2% in capital flight. More importantly, all specifications in Table 3 (I) explain more than 90% of the sample variation in capital flight.
Most other control variables display the expected signs. The return differentials (R 2 R f ) and GDP have a negative and statistically significant impact on capital flight at the 1% level confirming our hypothesis above. Likewise, capital flight increases as the variance of inflation rates (s 2 INF) rises, and is statistically different from zero at the 5% level. The variance of real exchange rates (s 2 EXR) is also positively related to the dependent variable and is significant at the 1% level. The variance of interest rates (s 2 INT) is not statistically significant. A joint estimation of all economic risk variables per specification (D) in Table 3 (I) indicates that only the variance of the exchange rates (s 2 EXR) remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
In Table 3 (II), we analyze the impact of ICRG on capital flight. The results reveal that ICRG has a positive and significant impact on capital flight at the 1% level. Comparing Tables 3(I) and 3(II), we notice that ICRG has more significant impact on capital flight but with lower magnitude. This is because the ICRG score is a broader measure of governance that captures the overall impact of risk on capital flight.
In order to test for the robustness in the full sample, a sub-sample of 45 developing countries is also estimated with results reported in Table 4. A  comparison of Tables 3 and 4 suggests a similarity between the estimated parameters of all control variables. In Table 4(I), corruption remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in specifications (A) and (B), but loses significance in specifications (C) and (D). 6 However, it should be noted that the coefficient of the corruption variable is higher in comparison to the full sample results of Table 3(I) suggesting that corruption leads to The significance of the variance of exchange rates in specifications (C) and (D) is probably due to the developing country sample employed and the time period of the study that includes the Mexican financial crisis (1995), the Asian financial crisis (1997), the Russian financial crisis (1998), and the Argentinean financial crisis (2001). As part of the sensitivity analysis, a cross-sectional analysis of the equilibrium capital flight equation is also conducted and reported in the Appendix. The cross-sectional results in Table A1 indicate a positive impact of corruption on capital flight that is statistically different from zero at the 1% level in all four specifications employed. The return differential (R 2 R f ) is not statistically significant, while GDP has a negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Specification (A) reveals that the variance of inflation rates (s 2 INF) has a positive and significant impact on capital flight at the 1% level. Specifications (B) and (C) suggest that both the variance of interest rates (s 2 INT) and the variance of real exchange rates (s 2 EXR) have a positive but insignificant impact on capital flight. Specification (D) jointly estimates the impact of economic risk parameters on capital flight. The variance of inflation rates (s 2 INF) rates remains statistically significant while the other types of economic risk do not gain significance. Table A2 provides a cross-sectional analysis for a sub-sample of 45 developing countries. Again, corruption remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level and the impact of corruption on the magnitude of capital flight remains relatively steady across various specifications. GDP and the variance of inflation rates (s 2 INF) remain statistically significant in specification (D). However, the regressions in Table A2 help explain only 20-30% of the variation in capital flight within the sub-sample of developing countries as compared to the 50% with the full sample data in Table A1 . This implies that capital flight occurs in both developed and developing countries. Thus, a larger sample of both groups yields better explanatory power in a cross-section of countries.
In addition to the cross-sectional analysis, we check for the stability of our regression results by incorporating additional control variables. The purpose of this particular exercise is to ascertain whether the positive association between capital flight and corruption is invalidated by the inclusion of other (theoretically appropriate) macro variables. Previous empirical studies have established a statistically significant impact of external debt, foreign aid, macroeconomic factors and the fiscal policy situation on capital flight (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2003; Hermes et al., 2002) . While  Tables 3 and 4 have included control variables for the macroeconomic environment, we select four additional variables from the empirical literature and include them in our re-estimation. The four variables are: foreign aid (AID); external debt (DEBT); tax revenues (TAX); and government consumption (GOVCONS) measured as a percentage of GDP. Data on these additional variables is obtained from the World Development Indicators (2004) . Table A3 in the Appendix reports the results obtained by including these in an econometric re-estimation of equation (8). As displayed in the table, corruption is still statistically significant at the 1% level in three out of five specifications, ceteris paribus. External debt (DEBT) is the only variable within our list of four that remains significant at the 1% level in specification (B) as well as within the full model specified in (D). Interestingly, the inclusion of external debt as an explanatory variable does not nullify our previous findings on the corruption-capital flight association as corruption also retains its statistical significance in specifications (B) and (D). Moreover, our Corruption -Capital Flight 535 results appear consistent with the sentiments of the NGO community as enunciated in the quote from the Capital Flight and Corruption Treaty cited at the beginning of the paper. The exact channels by which corruption and capital flight manifest themselves into poverty and debt crises merit further theoretical and empirical investigation.
In sum, as presented in Tables 3 and 4 and Tables A1 -A3 , corruption appears to be a positive and significant determinant of capital flight, regardless of how other economic risk and macro variables are specified. Further, this relationship has significant explanatory power in the entire sample of 69 countries as well as in the sub sample of 45 developing countries over the period 1995-2001.
Conclusion
There is an implicit belief that popular mechanisms of capital flight, such as bribes and kickbacks on government contracts, trade misinvoicing, outright cash transfers, and smuggling are instances of corruption in the broadest sense. Yet, the direct association between corruption and capital flight for a large set of countries has not been a subject of academic inquiry. This paper tests the direct linkage between corruption and capital flight on a sample of 69 countries over the period 1995-2001. The empirical results emerging from our analysis strongly suggest that corruption affects the magnitude of capital flight, controlling for the return differential, GDP, and standard economic risk parameters. We find that our research results hold up to a variety of sensitivity analyses such as cross-sectional testing and the inclusion of additional economic control variables.
Corruption and capital flight constitute road blocks to economic development. Countries that are attempting to staunch the outflow of capital would do well to examine their governance structures and encourage more institutional transparency to remedy domestic corruption. In terms of concrete suggestions, countries could begin by instituting reforms that at the very minimum address the following: public disclosures of assets and incomes of public officials and candidates running for public office; public disclosure of political campaign contributions; public blacklisting of firms engaging in bribery; and budgetary disclosures at the central, state, and local levels. 
